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Abstract
We investigate the sources of skewness in aggregate risk-factors and the cross-section
of stock returns. In an ICAPM setting with conditional volatility, we find theoretical
time series predictions on the relationships among volatility, returns, and skewness for
priced risk factors. Market returns resemble these predictions; however, size, book-
to-market, and momentum factor returns show alternative behavior, leading us to
conclude these factors are not priced risks. We link aggregate risk and skewness to
individual stocks and find empirically that the risk aversion effect manifests in indi-
vidual stock skewness. Additionally, we find several firm characteristics that explain
stock skewness. Smaller firms, value firms, highly levered firms, and firms with poor
credit ratings have more positive skewness.
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Elementary porfolio theory states that individuals evaluating a broadly diversified port-
folio are concerned only with systematic risk. Risk idiosyncratic to a particular stock is
not relevant. This notion has been ingrained into the finance field; however, the nature of
systematic risk is still not thoroughly understood.
Considerable recent research in the sources of systematic risk has focused on negative
skewness in individual stocks and the stock market as a whole. A number of papers including
Bae, Kim, and Nelson (2007), Bekaert and Wu (2000), and Campbell and Hentschel (1992)
have documented a “volatility feedback” effect where future high volatility is associated
with low returns and high future expected returns. Berd, Engle, and Voronov (2005) show
that this volatility feedback effect induces negative skewness in the market. Furthermore,
Dittmar (2002), Harvey and Siddique (2000), Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), and others
have studied how preference for positive skewness can generate a risk premium on negatively
skewed assets. Harvey and Siddique in particular claimed that skewness preference may
explain anomalies such as the momentum effect.
Aside from papers focusing on empirically observed stock returns, a growing literature
has also documented skewness of individual stocks as it manifests in option prices. Bakshi,
Kapadia, and Madan (2003) examined risk-netural skewness of the market and 30 individual
stocks and found negative skewness in both, with less negative skewness in individual stocks.
Dennis and Mayhew (2002) found that risk-neutral skewness of individual stocks is more
negative for stocks with higher β and in times when the market is more negatively skewed
or has higher volatility. Duan and Wei (2006) studied implied volatility smiles and found
that systematic risk is priced in the options smile, which is indicative of aggregate negative
skewness manifesting in individual stocks.
In this paper we study negative skewness in priced risk factors and individual stocks.
The goal of this study is twofold. First, we establish the basis for asymmetric volatility and
negative skewness in risk factor returns with an intertemporal capital asset pricing model
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setting. We use this as a basis for testing which of the Fama-French-Carhart factors are
priced risk factors. We find that provided our risk aversion hypothesis is true, only market
risk appears to be priced.
Next, we examine the sources of skewness in individual stocks. We find that the market
asymmetric volatility effect manifests in individual stock returns and in option-based risk-
neutral density skewness. Stocks with higher systematic risk exhibit more negative skews.
We also find several idiosyncratic firm characteristic effects on skewness. Smaller firms have
more positively skewed returns than larger firms. Consistent with Hong, Wang, and Yu
(2007) we also find that firms with fewer financial constraints and whose stock price has
declined have more positively skewed returns.
This paper differs from previous literature in the following. First, we use aversion to
systematic risk and time-varying volatility to study the question of whether covariation in
returns results from underlying priced risk or a statistical artifact. Second, we study skewness
using a much larger universe of firms as well as both physical and risk-neutral measures of
skewness. Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) used options on the 30 largest stocks. Dennis
and Mayhew (2002) used options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. We use
the entire CRSP/Compustat universe to analyze physical measure stock return skewness
and the Optionmetrics’ IvyDB database, which contains all US listed options, to analyze
risk-neutral measure skewness. The broader sample offers us further insight into the cross-
sectional variation of skewness.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the theoretical link between time-
varying volatility in priced risk factors and time series properties of returns. Section 2
studies the time series properties of the Fama-French-Carhart factors for evidence of priced
risk. Section 3 links aggregate risk and asymmetric volatility to individual stock skewness,
tests this relationship empirically, and identifies idiosyncratic sources of individual stock
skewness.
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1 Risk Aversion, Time-Varying Volatility, and Skew-
ness
Consider the setting of Merton’s (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM).
An investor holds a portfolio which is a linear combination of the market portfolio and m
portfolios that have the highest correlation with m state variables that determine the invest-
ment opportunity set. In this setting suppose that investment opportunities are good when
a state variable is high. Then an asset whose return is positively correlated with this state
variable will be a poor hedge against adverse shocks to investment opportunities and hence
will command a positive risk premium.
Suppose volatility of the market and of several state variables is itself time varying. In
this scenario, if market volatility is expected to increase rational investors will demand less
of assets subject to market risk. This results in a contemporaneous drop in market returns
and a higher future market risk premium.
If volatility of a state variable increases the covariance of returns with that state variable
will increase. Hence, assets which command a risk premium will be even less desirable as
investors will be fearful of the increased probability of a large adverse shock to the investment
opportunity set. Rational investors will choose to hold less of such assets, which will lead to
low contemporaneous returns and high future expected returns on the assets that have the
highest premium on the risk of the state variable.
More formally, in the ICAPM assets can be priced by a stochastic discount factor that
is linear in a set of state variables or mimicking portfolios fit.
mt+1 = at + b1t f1,t+1 + · · ·+ bmt fm,t+1 (1)
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All assets obey the one period pricing equation
Et
[
mt+1(1 + rt+1)
]
= 1 (2)
which can be rewritten as
Et
[
1 + rt+1
]
=
1− Covt[mt+1, 1 + rt+1]
Et[mt+1]
(3)
Assuming there exists a riskfree asset with return rft+1, combining with (1) and rewriting,
we get
Et[rt+1] = r
f
t+1 − (1 + rft+1)
{
b1t Covt(f1,t+1, rt+1) + · · ·+ bmt Covt(fm,t+1, rt+1)
}
(4)
By defining betas in the usual fashion, this can be written as
Et[rt+1] = r
f
t+1 − (1 + rft+1)
{
b1tβ1t V art(f1,t+1) + · · ·+ bmtβmt V art(fm,t+1)
}
(5)
Assume that the bi and βi coefficients are constant across time. Then, if volatility of a factor
increases, the risk premium on that factor will widen. Hence following a positive shock to
volatility of a factor, assets that experience a positive risk premium on that factor (such
as a factor mimicking portfolio) will see a positive shock to future discount rates, leading
to a contemporaneous decrease in returns. In other words, the model predicts a negative
contemporaneous correlation between shocks to volatility of a factor and returns on the
factor mimicking portfolio.
This volatility-return correlation has been observed for the market factor in many papers
dating back to Black (1976) and Christie (1982). Whether a factor is priced risk can poten-
tially be tested by examining evidence of asymmetric volatility in factor returns. According
5
to the above argument, priced risk factors should exhibit a contemporaneous negative re-
lation between returns and volatility. Other returns may not display this phenomenon. In
fact, Dennis, Mayhew, and Stivers (2006) found greater evidence of asymmetric volatility in
the systematic component of stock returns than in stock idiosyncracies.
The asymmetric volatility effect also produces a particular time aggregation pattern in
returns, as documented by Berd, Engle, and Voronov (2005). The skewness of returns grows
more negative for longer horizons. Panel (e) of Figure 1 shows the skewness of returns at
varying horizons simulated using an asymmetric GARCH model with parameters estimated
from market returns. The one-day return is slightly negatively skewed; however, skewness
becomes more negative as the return horizon expands to quarterly returns. As the return
horizon expands further, by the central limit theorem returns converge to a symmetric normal
distribution. We would expect such a pattern for the returns of any priced risk factor.
Although we presented the intuition in terms of the ICAPM, the resulting link between
returns and volatility of a factor is more general than the ICAPM setting. All that is needed
for the above analysis is a representative agent economy where the stochastic discount factor
is linear in a set of variables. The Ross (1976) arbitrage pricing theory model would predict
the same results.
2 Asymmetric Volatility in the Fama-French-Carhart
Factors
Fama and French (1992) proposed a three factor pricing model of stock returns includ-
ing the standard CAPM market factor, along with factors whose mimicking portfolios are
constructed based on size and book-to-market ratios of the cross-section of stock returns.
Carhart (1997) added a factor constructed based on stock return momentum. These stud-
ies argued the factor returns were priced risk by examining historical returns of portfolios
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isolating that risk.
The first task of this paper is to revisit the question of whether the Fama-French-Carhart
factors are priced risk factors. Rather than looking at expected returns, however, we exam-
ine to what extent these factors exhibit asymmetric volatility and the previously discussed
pattern of time aggregation in return skewness as evidence of priced risk.
Figure 1 reports the observed empirical skewness of each factor’s returns at horizons of
1 to 250 days. We calculated skewness using overlapping returns from 1988 to 2005. The
market factor appears to fit the pattern. One day returns are slightly negative and grow
more negative with time aggregation. The skewness does not seem to converge to zero at
longer horizons, however, this may be an artifact of relatively few yearly return observations
in the 18 year sample.
The other factors, however, show little to no resemblance to the theoretical prediction.
One day size factor returns are negatively skewed, but quarterly returns are actually posi-
tively skewed. The book-to-market and momentum factors also exhibit more positive skew-
ness with time aggregation in returns.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The same results manifest in parameter estimation of the asymmetric GARCH model on
each of the factors. Table 1 reports the estimation of the following specification on each of
the Fama-French-Carhart factors.
rt = µ+ εt , εt =
√
htηt , ηt ∼ N(0, 1) (6)
ht = ω + αε
2
t−1 + γε
2
t−1It−1 + βht−1 (7)
[Table 1 about here.]
According to our hypothesis of volatility feedback, the coefficient on the asymmetric
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term ε2t−1It−1 should be positive, thus encapsulating the negative relation between returns
and volatility. The parameter estimate is significantly positive for the market factor. For
the other factors, however, the parameter is negative and less significant. The coefficient of
asymmetry on the size factor in particular is an order of magnitude smaller than its market
factor counterpart.
These results seem to suggest that, contrary to the ICAPM prediction, as variance of a
state variable increases and hence covariance of returns with that state variable increases,
the risk premium on that factor decreases. If the risk premium arises from investor desire
to hedge against adverse shocks to the investment opportunity set, this would imply that
investors demand more of assets that become worse hedges.
An alternative explanation is that shocks to volatility of size, book-to-market, and mo-
mentum factors are negatively correlated with shocks to market volatility. In this case, a
positive shock to a factor such as size would have two effects on the size factor mimicking
portfolio. First, through the volatility feedback effect, returns on that portfolio would de-
crease. However, if the portfolio has a positive market beta, market volatility would cause
returns to increase. Theoretically, this second effect could dominate, yielding the results
shown Table 1.
In unreported results, we checked for this possibility by calculating the correlations of
the estimated GARCH variance series from (6). All pairwise correlations were positive.
Furthermore, innovations in the four variance series were also positively correlated. Hence,
a positive shock to size factor volatility is also associated with a positive shock to market
volatility, and hence the contemporaneous return on the size mimicking portfolio should
decrease, a result which does not appear in the data.
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3 Systematic and Idiosyncratic Sources of Firm Skew-
ness
The preceding discussion focused on analyzing aggregate risk factors for evidence of asym-
metric volatility. Next, we link individual stock skewness to aggregate risk factor skewness
and show that the asymmetric volatility effect that produces negative skewness in the market
appears in the cross section of individual stock returns. Stocks which have higher component
of aggregate risk have more negative skewness.
Since we have argued that the market factor is the only priced risk factor, consider a
one factor model. Assume that individual stock idiosyncracies are uncorrelated with mar-
ket variance and that idiosyncratic stock variance is uncorrelated with market returns. In
the appendix we show that this implies the skewness of individual stock returns can be
decomposed as
SKEWi =
(
βiσm
σi
)3
SKEWm +
(
σεi
σi
)3
SKEWεi (8)
where SKEWi is the skewness of stock i, SKEWm is market skewness, and SKEWεi is
the skewness of stock i’s idiosyncratic returns. Equation (8) states that individual stock
skewness is a linear function of market skewness. Note that the multiplier for the market
skewness is equal to sign(βi)×(R2)3/2, where R2 is the population R2 of a CAPM regression,
ie. the proportion of return variance that is systematic. We will denote this quantity as R3i .
We know that the market skewness component is negative. Hence, we would expect to find
that stocks with higher R3i tend to have more negative skewness.
It should be noted that the downside risk implied by this relationship is aggregate risk.
Hence, aggregate risk impacts the pricing of individual stock options, a prediction that is
consistent with the results of Duan and Wei (2006), who found evidence that systematic
risk is priced in options in that stocks with higher systematic risk have steeper smiles and
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higher implied volatilties. We will show that stocks with a higher component of systematic
risk have more negative skewness in the risk-neutral distribution implied by option prices.
In addition, we examine the idiosyncratic sources of firm skewness through our cross-
sectional study. Previous studies have found such sources to be important in determining
firm skewness. Hong, Wang, and Yu (2007) argued that firms which have relatively few
financing constraints have more positive skewness due to their ability to repurchase shares
following a price decline. They additionally found that firms with large market capitalization,
high leverage, high market-to-book ratios, or whose stock has increased tend to have more
negative skewness. Dennis and Mayhew (2002) also found that larger stocks have more
negative skewness; however, in their sample risk-neutral skewness was more positive for
firms with higher leverage. We will attempt to revisit these effects with our broader sample.
3.1 Data
We conduct our analysis using stock returns from CRSP, accounting data from COMPUS-
TAT, analyst data from IBES, and option data from Optionmetrics. The stock return-based
skewness data are from 1988-2005, and the option-based skewness data span 1996-2005. The
firm characteristic variables are used as lagged predictors, hence they span 1987-2004.
3.1.1 Physical measure skewness
For each year and each stock from 1988-2005, we calculate daily, monthly, and quarterly
overlapping continuously compounded returns within the year. We then calculate skewness
of the returns at daily, monthly, and quarterly horizons for each year. For stocks with
missing observations, we use all available observations within the year. To remove outliers,
we discard any skewness values greater than three in magnitude.
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3.1.2 Firm characteristics
Firm characteristics are computed as follows. Using CRSP daily returns for each stock, we
calculate the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure Illiq yearly. Firm β is estimated as the sum
of β1, β2, and β3 in the following regression based on Scholes and Williams (1977), calculated
for each stock within each year. The lead and lag terms account for nonsynchronicity in
trading.
rit = α+ β1rm,t−1 + β2rmt + β3rm,t+1 + εit (9)
To remove outliers, we discard values of β larger than 10 in magnitude. We also use the R2
of this regression to compute firm R3, defined as sign(β)× (R2)3/2 to match the relationship
between firm and market skewness in equation (8).
We use year end data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT for the following characteris-
tics. Logsize is the log of year end price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.
Leverage, the debt to assets ratio, is computed using the book value of debt and market
value of equity. Credit is the S&P credit rating, scaled so that 0 is AAA, 1 is AA+, and so
on. For firms that are missing a credit rating, we assign Credit = 8, which corresponds to
the median rating of BBB. We also create an indicator variable Missingcredit which is one
if the credit ring was not available. BM , the book to market ratio, is calculated using the
accounting value of equity and the end of year market price. This variable is windsorized at
the 99th percentile.
Lastly, we retrieve the average number of analysts Numanalyst covering each firm in
each year from IBES. For firms which have no data, we set Numanalyst to zero.
3.1.3 Risk-netural measure skewness
We use the Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) approach to computing skewness of the risk-
neutral distribution using option prices. There are several difficulties with this approach.
11
First, we do not observe a continuum of strikes; there are discretely spaced strike prices. Sec-
ond, observed option prices are generally on American options, whereas the BKM technique
relies on European option prices. Third, and most important, there are often several put
options and few call options or few put options with multiple call options on a single day.
This is especially true after larger stock price movements. For example, after a large price
drop there may only be one or two out-of-the-money put options and many such call options.
Dennis and Mayhew (2002) mitigate this third bias by discarding some options so that the
domain of integration is symmetric. A difficulty with this approach is that risk-neutral skew-
ness is heavily dependent on the tails of the distribution. By discarding far out-of-the-money
options, the measure of risk-neutral skewness becomes significantly less accurate.
Our approach is instead to fit a curve for the implied volatility smile as a function of
moneyness on each date. The approach is as follows. From Optionmetrics, we obtain the
implied volatilities for each option on a given stock and date. We average the implied
volatilities for put and call options on the same maturity, underlying, and strike. For each
option we calculate the moneyness, defined as ln(K/S)−rT
σ
√
T
, using the linearly interpolated
zero coupon interest rate from Optionmetrics, the current stock price, and the historical 22
trading day volatility calculated from returns.
Next we fit a quadratic spline with a knot at 0 to the implied volatilities as a function
of moneyness. We discard any options with |moneyness| > 2 or maturity less than 90
days and any observations where all options have only positive or only negative moneyness1.
Assuming European options with equivalent strike and maturity have the same implied
volatilities as their American counterparts, we then calculate European call option prices for
one month maturity options on a continuum of strike prices with moneyness up to ±20. In
this calculation we assume that the implied volatility slope is constant for |moneyness| below
1Two standard deviations were chosen as the cutoff point due to a lack of quality data on deep out-of-
the-money observations which appeared to be noisy and unreliable.
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-2 and above 2.2 We then calculate the relevant integrals and apply the BKM formula to
obtain the risk-neutral skewness for each stock on each date. Lastly, we average the skewness
for each firm across each year to match the firm-year observations of our other data.
3.2 Preliminary Analysis
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the firm skewness and characteristics observations.
Our common sample comprises 108,520 firm-year observations of daily, monthly, and quar-
terly return skewness and end-of-previous year firm characteristics. There are between 4,632
and 7,410 firms within each year. In analyzing risk-neutral skewness, our sample consists of
21,146 firm-year observations spanning 1996-2005. All statistics and analysis done involving
risk-neutral skewness is done for this subsample; other statistics are reported for the full
sample.
[Table 2 about here.]
Note from the table that average skewness of daily individual stock is positive with a
value of 0.1561. The average skewness measures display the previously discussed pattern of
time aggregation. Monthly return skewness is less positive, and quarterly return skewness is
actually slightly negative, with an average skewness of -0.0037.
Using the method described above, we found an average risk-neutral skewness of -0.0037.
It is important to note that the level of skewness varied depending on the cutoff point of
moneyness chosen. We found that the implied volatility smile is left skewed; however, due to
the asymmetry in curvature between the left and right tails, deep OTM call volatilities were
often higher than deep OTM put volatilties even when less OTM call volatilities were lower
2We also tried extrapolating based on the quadratic spline and based on a linear slope on each tail of the
implied volatility smile. Both approaches failed to produce option prices that converge to zero. The implied
volatilities in each case rose so quickly that options further out of the money would have higher prices, which
is a violation of no arbitrage.
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than equivalently OTM put volatilties. Due to this shape of the smile, a higher moneyness
threshold produces more positive skewness. The main interest of this paper is to analyze
cross-sectional variation and not the level of skewness itself. Hence, we chose a low threshold
where option data is more abundant to ensure less noisy measures of risk-neutral skewness.
We are missing credit rating data on 80% of our sample, hence we do not expect great pre-
dictive power of the Credit variable. Our analyst coverage data fares much better. Roughly
53% of the observations have positive analyst coverage.
Our measure of β appears to be highly noisy. The average β is considerably less than
one, which implies that in our sample we have many small stocks whose returns appear not
to covary greatly with the market. Furthermore, as reported in Table 3 rank correlations
between β and other firm characteristics are much larger than Pearson correlations. For
example, the Spearman correlation between β and R3 is 0.69, whereas the Pearson correlation
is only 0.38. These effects may be due to mismeasured βs stemming from measurement error
in returns.
[Table 3 about here.]
The difficulty in estimating β carries into our key firm characteristic variable, firm R3. In
particular, R3 is highly correlated with firm size. The Pearson correlation between R3 and
Logsize is 0.54. This high correlation renders difficulty in separating the effects of systematic
risk and idiosyncratic firm size on firm skewness. Both variables, however, have considerable
explanatory power. Table 4 reports skewness for sorts based on firm size and by R3. In Panel
A ten deciles were assigned in each year based on firm size. For each decile we calculated
average R3, daily, montly, and quarterly return skewness, and risk-neutral skewness. Note
that there are relatively few observations for risk-neutral skewness in the smallest three size
deciles.
[Table 4 about here.]
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Discarding the smallest three size deciles, firm skewness is more positive for smaller firms.
For over half of the observations, empirical skewness was positive at all horizons. For the
largest stocks, however, skewness is negative at monthly and quarterly horizons as well as in
the risk-neutral measure. These findings paint a picture broader than but consistent with
Bakshi, Madan, and Kapadia (2003). In their study of the 30 largest stocks, they found that
the stocks had negative risk-neutral skewness, albeit less negative than the market. Here
we find that the largest stocks tend to be negatively skewed, but the cross-section of stocks
shows considerable variation.
The effect of size may be due primarily to a correlation of firm size and R3. In Panel
B of Table 4, we report firm skewness for R3 sorted deciles. In each year we assign ten
deciles based on firm R3 and calculate average firm size, daily, monthly, and quarterly return
skewness, and risk-neutral skewness. Clearly, higher R3 is associated with larger firm size.
Although R3 is a weaker predictor of daily return skewness, with time aggregation the effect
of R3 is strong. Discarding the lowest two R3 deciles, monthly and quarterly skewness are
monotonically decreasing in firm R3. The risk-neutral skewness exhibits a similar pattern
aside from the lower R3 deciles.
3.3 Regression Results
Lastly, we perform a regression analysis of the sources of skewness in individual stock returns.
Central to our analysis is the asymmetric volatility effect which produces negative skewness
in market returns. We estimate the following three specifications to see this effect in the
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cross section of returns and also analyze idiosyncratic sources of skewness.
SKEWit =β0 + β1R
3
it + β2Illiqit + εit (10)
SKEWit =β0 + β1R
3
it + β2Illiqit + β3V olit + β4BMit + εit (11)
SKEWit =β0 + β1R
3
it + β2Illiqit + β3V olit + β4BMit + β5Logsizeit (12)
+ β6Leverageit + β7Creditit +Year Dummies + εit
We estimate the panel regression coefficients by ordinary least squares. OLS errors are
biased in the presence of correlation across firm or across time. In a regression of various
firm characteristics, we would expect to find significant time series correlation. To account
for the correlation within firm across time, we use Rogers (1993) clustered standard errors.
Previous studies such as Dennis and Mayhew (2002) and Bakshi, Madan, and Kapadia (2003)
used the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Petersen (2007) has shown that with firm
serial correlation, Fama-MacBeth standard errors are considerably biased and often worse
than OLS standard errors. Clustered standard errors, on the other hand, approximate the
true errors much better.
This accounts for correlation across time. To check robustness to correlation across firm
within time periods, we add year dummies to the regression specification. Table 5 presents
the results of this estimation.
[Table 5 about here.]
The univariate regressions show a very strong and consistent effect of systematic risk
in individual stock skewness. As predicted, the coefficient on R3 is negative, reflecting the
negative skewness of the market. At the monthly horizon, it is more negative than at the
daily horizon. At the quarterly horizon, however, it is less negative. This appears to defy the
time aggregation pattern predicted earlier; however, it could be an artifact of few quarterly
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observations within each year. In the risk-neutral measure, the systematic risk of a stock
has considerable effect on skewness. The coefficient on R3 for the risk-neutral skewness
regression is nearly three times as large (-0.8656) than it is for daily skewness (-0.2533).
This effect is generally robust to controls for liquidity, volatility, and book-to-market.
Again, size captures much of the explanatory power of R3. When firm size is added to
the specification, the coefficent on R3 is no longer significant at the monthly and quarterly
horizons and is much less significant at the daily horizon or in the risk-neutral measure. We
regard size as a proxy for β, which is measured poorly. Indeed, as shown above, the two
variables are highly correlated and in a regression setting it is difficult to distinguish the
effects of each variable.
Coefficients on firm characteristics also seem to have considerable effect on skewness.
One theory for firm idiosyncratic skewness, advanced by Hong, Wang, and Yu (2007) is
that irrational investors may drive own the price of a stock temporarily. Rational managers
that are not financial constrained will then repurchase shares, thus creating more positive
skewness for firms that have experienced declines and are less constrained.
We find evidence consistent with the Hong, Wang, and Yu hypothesis. The coefficient
on the book-to-market ratio is generally positive and significant, which implies that value
stocks are more positively skewed than growth stocks. This is consistent with a hypothesis of
overselling of stocks that have experienced a decline. Additionally, our estimated coefficients
on Leverage and Credit are negative or zero. This implies that less levered firms and firms
with better credit ratings are more positively skewed, consistent with the notion that firms
with lower financial constraints have more positive skewness.
The coefficients on illiquidity and volatility are more puzzling. Higher illiquidity implies
more negative skewness at daily horizons but more positive skewness in the risk-neutral
distribution and at longer horizons. Higher volatility implies negative daily return skewness
and in the risk-neutral distribution but positive skewness at longer horizons. We do not have
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a compelling explanation of these effects.
4 Conclusion
We study the sources of skewness in individual stock returns. Theoretically in a linear
factor model, an increase in future volatility of a priced risk factor is associated with a
contemporaneous drop in returns on that factor. This gives rise to an asymmetric volatility
model which has been documented for the market factor. We estimate this model on the
Fama-French-Carhart factors and conclude that only market risk is priced.
We then link individual stock skewness to skewness of the market and conclude that firms
with higher systematic risk as measured by R3 have more negatively skewed returns. We
measure skewness of individual stocks under the physical and risk-neutral densities using
stock returns and option prices and find supporting evidence in both measures. In addition,
larger firms, value firms, levered firms, and financially constrained firms have more positive
skewness.
Future research could investigate further the link between skewness and various firm
characteristics. Although Hong, Wang, and Yu have proposed a model where stock skewness
is related to credit quality, we have no such explanation for the potential link between stock
liquidity and skewness documented in our regression results. More work could be done to
understand the idiosyncratic sources of skewness.
A Individual Stock Skewness Decomposition
We decompose skewness of individual stock returns as follows. Write
rt = βrmt + εt (13)
18
where β is defined as Cov(rt,rmt)
V ar(rmt)
. Denote the mean and variance of rt, rmt, and εt by
µ, σ2, µm, σ
2
m, µε, and σ
2
ε respectively, where all expectations in this derivation may be taken
conditionally or unconditionally. Note that
µ = βµm + µε (14)
and that
Cov(rmt, εt) = Cov(rmt, rt − Cov(rt, rmt)
V ar(rmt)
rmt) = 0 (15)
Assume that Cov(r2mt, εt) = 0 and Cov(rmt, ε
2
t ) = 0. Now decompose skewness of the
stock return by
E
[(
rt − µ
σ
)3]
=E
[(
βrmt + εt − µ
σ
)3]
=E
[(
βrmt − βµm + εt + βµm − µ
σ
)3]
separating and using (14), we get
=E
[(
β
rmt − µm
σ
+
εt − µε
σ
)3]
=β3E
[(
rmt − µm
σ
)3]
+ 3β2E
[(
rmt − µm
σ
)2(
εt − µε
σ
)]
+ 3βE
[(
rmt − µm
σ
)(
εt − µε
σ
)2]
+ E
[(
εt − µε
σ
)3]
=
β3σ3m
σ3
E
[(
rmt − µm
σm
)3]
+
3β2
σ3
E[r2mt(εt − µε)]
+
3β
σ3
E[ε2t (rmt − µm)] +
σ3ε
σ3
E
[(
εt − µε
σε
)3]
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By our assumptions, the middle two terms drop and we are left with
E
[(
rt − µ
σ
)3]
=
(
βσm
σ
)3
E
[(
rmt − µm
σm
)3]
+
(
σε
σ
)3
E
[(
εt − µε
σε
)3]
(16)
Equation (8) says that the skewness of an individual stock is the sum of the market skew-
ness and the skewness of the stock’s idiosyncratic component, weighted by the proportion of
stock volatility due to the market and idiosyncratic components.
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Figure 1: Average empirical skewness of Fama-French-Carhart factors at varying horizons.
Panels (a)-(d) show the skewness of each factor calculated for 1-day up to 250-day returns
from 1988-2005. Overlapping returns were used in the calculation. Panel (e) displays the
pattern of skewness from a simulated sample of 1 million days using the asymmetric GARCH
model of equation (6) and parameters estimated in Table 1.
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Table 1: Factor asymmetric volatility estimation. Maximum likelihood estimates are given
for estimating equation (6) on daily factor returns from 1988-2005 as provided on Kenneth
French’s website. The indicator variable It is positive if εt < 0.
Market Size B/M Momentum
Mean Equation
µ 0.0315 0.0013 0.0114 0.0482
t (2.71) (0.19) (2.11) (8.13)
Variance Equation
ω 0.0154 0.0045 0.0016 0.0012
t (10.92) (6.16) (5.17) (4.01)
ε2t−1 0.0166 0.0605 0.0994 0.1215
(2.73) (13.05) (14.89) (14.87)
ε2t−1It−1 0.1065 -0.0167 -0.0344 -0.0514
(13.00) (-2.52) (-4.52) (-6.20)
ht−1 0.9099 0.9318 0.9120 0.9079
(147.70) (172.30) (140.01) (172.62)
logL -5582.6 -3371.7 -2508.9 -3321.9
24
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for firm skewness and characteristics. The sample in-
cludes 108,520 yearly observations of firm skewness and characteristics spanning the
CRSP/Compustat universe from 1988-2005. Risk-neutral skewness is available only for a
sample of 21,146 firm-year observations spanning the Optionmetrics data of 1996-2005. The
risk-neutral skewness statistics reported are calculated for this smaller sample.
Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Skewness Measures
Daily 0.1562 0.5592 -2.9992 0.1348 2.9948
Monthly 0.0658 0.5473 -2.9989 0.0605 2.9689
Quarterly -0.0037 0.4969 -2.9895 -0.0014 2.8789
Risk-neutral* -0.2062 0.3765 -2.8467 -0.2150 6.3440
Firm Characteristics
R3 0.0338 0.0629 -0.3092 0.0080 0.6820
Illiq 1.30E-05 3.30E-05 1.18E-10 1.88E-06 0.0028
Volatility 0.5550 0.2701 0.0311 0.5080 1.6389
B/M 0.7164 0.6617 0.0000 0.5612 4.6090
Leverage 0.1342 0.1620 0.0000 0.0697 0.9813
Credit 8.1259 1.5893 0.0000 8.0000 21.0000
Beta 0.7467 0.7508 -8.4952 0.6540 9.0861
Logsize 18.5868 2.1235 9.8255 18.4656 27.1242
MissingCredit 0.8009 0.3993 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Numanalyst 2.9226 4.9454 0.0000 1.0000 43.3750
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Table 4: Skewness by firm size decile and by firm R3 decile. Reported for each decile are
mean firm size, R3, risk-neutral skewness, and realized return skewness at daily, monthly,
and quarterly horizons.
Panel A: Skewness by Size Decile
Decile Logsize R3 Daily Monthly Quarterly Risk-neutral*
1 15.2958 0.0027 0.0791 0.1149 0.0004 0.2922
2 16.4537 0.0042 0.1640 0.1569 0.0284 -0.0247
3 17.1150 0.0066 0.1938 0.1593 0.0283 -0.0847
4 17.6665 0.0105 0.2217 0.1397 0.0271 -0.1518
5 18.1857 0.0172 0.2137 0.1076 0.0174 -0.1575
6 18.7247 0.0254 0.1978 0.0682 0.0031 -0.1530
7 19.2952 0.0367 0.1693 0.0224 -0.0218 -0.1877
8 19.9304 0.0490 0.1534 -0.0121 -0.0289 -0.1874
9 20.7692 0.0667 0.1211 -0.0357 -0.0398 -0.1995
10 22.4310 0.1187 0.0478 -0.0630 -0.0514 -0.2602
Panel B: Skewness by R3 Decile
Decile R3 Logsize Daily Monthly Quarterly Risk-neutral*
1 -0.0041 17.0304 0.1229 0.1215 0.0205 -0.1380
2 0.0006 16.9429 0.1406 0.1382 0.0196 -0.2052
3 0.0022 17.2797 0.1720 0.1287 0.0215 -0.1593
4 0.0049 17.6481 0.1703 0.1095 0.0120 -0.1979
5 0.0093 18.0858 0.1794 0.0877 0.0034 -0.1748
6 0.0164 18.5832 0.1813 0.0642 -0.0050 -0.1966
7 0.0271 19.0573 0.1750 0.0387 -0.0095 -0.1858
8 0.0438 19.5741 0.1607 0.0147 -0.0227 -0.1894
9 0.0734 20.2110 0.1547 -0.0157 -0.0371 -0.2057
10 0.1640 21.4555 0.1050 -0.0292 -0.0397 -0.2484
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